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A Critical Look at New Haven’s Tax-and-Tow Program:  




 In the spring of 2008, Crown Auto Center—along with four other New Haven towing 
companies—petitioned the City to investigate whether another towing operator, Anthony 
Monaco, had improperly gained a second spot on the police department’s towing rotation.
1
 As 
established by New Haven’s “tow truck ordinance,” the police department must rotate municipal 
towing assignments among eligible towers on a “reasonably fair, equitable, and 
nondiscriminatory basis . . . .”
 2
 Writing to the City, Crown and other protesting towers alleged 
that Mr. Monaco, already the owner of one towing outfit, Lombard Motors, had created a “new” 
sham business—Anthony’s High-Tech—in an illegitimate attempt to gain a second spot on the 
rotation and thus increase his share of the City’s towing assignments.
3
 Their letter to New 
Haven’s then-Corporation Counsel, John Ward, noted that Anthony’s was located next-door to 
Lombard and that Mr. Monaco remained the landlord for both properties.
4
 The letter then went 
on to express their 
concern[] about the legality and fairness of allowing one business owner . . . to 
take two spots on the city’s rotation list . . . .We understand that the Chief of 
Police can add up to ten tow companies to the rotation list. However we question 
the rationale of allowing double dipping or a monopoly to occur.
5
 
                                                     
1
 Paul Bass, “We’re Not Double-Dipping,” NEW HAVEN INDEP., Apr. 7, 2008, 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/were_not_double-dipping.  
2
 NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. III, art. V, §§ 29-105 to -119 (Municode 2012). 
3




 Id. (emphasis added); see also tit. III, art. V § 29-118  (“The chief of police or his designee shall prepare 
annually and maintain a list, to be called the “municipal towers list,” of licensed towers in the city not to 




Responding to the complaint, the City appeared to share these concerns and, in fact, 
decided to remove Mr. Monaco’s second company from the rotation.
6
 When asked for comment, 
the City’s Chief Administrative Officer, Rob Smuts, told the New Haven Independent that it was 
“‘not really in the public interest to have a restricted group of people doing the tows . . . .’”
 7
 
 However, in the fall of the following year, neither the City nor Crown seemed as 
concerned about the inequitable distribution of towing assignments—or potential “monopoly”—
when the City decided to grant a substantial share of its municipal towing work exclusively to 
Crown.
8
 After soliciting and reviewing bids via the Request for Proposals (RFP) process,
9
 the 
City hired Crown to locate, boot, and, if necessary, tow all vehicles on which delinquent motor 
vehicle taxes and parking fines were owed.
10
 As part of this program (hereinafter, the tax-and-
tow program), the City also gave Crown the responsibility of collecting payments on these 
delinquent bills after hours, so that vehicle owners could retrieve their cars even when the City’s 
Tax and Collections offices were closed.
11
 
 Now, Crown found itself on the opposite side of a petition to the City. Facing a decline in 
business, the other eight members of the towing rotation—Catapano’s, Columbus, Fountain’s, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
6
 Paul Bass, Monaco Takes Another Hit, NEW HAVEN INDEP., May 14, 2008, 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/monaco_takes_another_hit. However, the 
City eventually did reinstate Anthony’s High-Tech to the rotation after Mr. Monaco divided ownership of 
the two companies between him and his father. Interview with Officer Francis Lombardi, Chief of the 
Mun. Towing Unit, New Haven Police Dep’t, in New Haven, Conn. (Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview with Officer Lombardi] (included in appendix). For a further discussion of this controversial 
arrangement and an account of Mr. Monaco’s more recent suspensions from the rotation, see.   
7
 Bass, “We’re Not Double-Dipping,” supra note 1. 
8
 Paul Bass, VioAlert Bags the Boot, NEW HAVEN INDEP., Oct. 16, 2009, 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/vioalert_bags_the_boot.   
9
 Request for Proposals No. 29-9-675: Wheel Immobilizers or Wheel Stops from the New Haven, Conn. 
Bureau of Purchases (Sept. 13, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2009 RFP]. 
10
 See Agreement by & Between the City of New Haven, Conn. & Crown Auto Center (Oct. 30, 2009) (on 





Megill’s, Tony’s Long Wharf, Unlimited, York, and even Lombard—wrote the Board of 
Aldermen to protest Crown’s “monopoly” contract.
12
 Representing the eight towers, Attorney 
Robert Oliver wrote that “[a]ssignment to one tower alone violates the [tow truck] ordinance,” 
and added that “[p]ermitting a private company . . . to collect [the delinquent tax and parking 
bills] . . . is manifestly unwise and carries the risk of loss or misappropriation of the moneys.”
13
 
At a subsequent meeting with the Board, Oliver further charged that the program violated state 
law, arguing that Crown did not hold the license required to collect taxes in Connecticut.
14
 
Much to the dismay of the aggrieved towers, the City successfully defended the program 
to the Board.
15
 The City emphasized that Crown’s contract had been awarded via the 
“‘appropriate protocol’”
16
—the RFP process—and that the program was “intended for the 
convenience of the taxpayer.”
17
 The City also presented the Board with a letter from the State 
Department of Banking, certifying that Crown did not need a license to collect taxes.
18
 Satisfied 
by the State’s approval, the Board allowed the City to continue the tax-and-tow program.
19
  
                                                     
12




 Letter from Att’y Robert Oliver to the New Haven, Conn. Bd. of Alderman 2 (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/archives/upload/2010/04/Towing_Petition.doc [hereinafter Towing 
Petition]. Vin DiLauro, owner of Columbus Auto Body, explained that the petitioning towers had decided 
not to sue the City because “‘[t]he city’s [already] got enough lawsuits . . . .’” MacMillan, Towing 
Companies Cry Foul at Crown’s Monopoly, supra note 12. 
14





 The aldermen did, however, question city officials about the legality and propriety of the program. Jay 
Dockendorf, Alderman Want Answers on Towing Contract, NEW HAVEN INDEP., June 4, 2010, http:// 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/aldermanic_council_hears_arguments_on
_towing.   
16
 MacMillan, Towing Companies Cry Foul at Crown’s Monopoly, supra note 12.  
17
 MacMillan, Towing Companies: Prize Contract Breaks Law, supra note 14.  
18
 Letter from Howard F. Pitkin, State Banking Comm’r, Conn., to Kathleen M. Foster, Assistant Corp. 
Counsel, City of New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/archives/upload/2010/12/Bankingletter.pdf [hereinafter State 
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In fact, to this day, the City continues to operate this program and recently, via a January 
2013 Request for Qualifications (RFQ),
20
 decided to re-award its contract to Crown.
21
 
Nevertheless, although the eight towers have proven unable to halt the program, the questions 
posed by their complaint remain: Was it a smart decision for the City to award the entire tax-and-
tow contract to a single provider? Moreover, even if awarding the contract to a single provider 
brought improvements, what problems did that decision create for the program going forward? 
And how might the City address those issues?  
To answer these questions, this paper will provide an in-depth case study of New 
Haven’s effort to collect delinquent vehicle bills. Part I will provide both a history of the 
program’s development and an overview of the City’s current arrangement with Crown. Part II 
will then offer a preliminary assessment of this arrangement. This Part will describe how the 
City’s decision to consolidate three previously separate services—booting, towing, and tax 
collection—into a single contract award helped improve the program in two significant ways: it 
allowed the City to (1) continue and expand the use of booting, as an alternative to towing; and 
(2) offer 24/7 bill payment and vehicle retrieval. However, despite these improvements, the 
City’s arrangement with Crown still suffers from a substantial weakness: it does not adequately 
safeguard against the possibility of Crown’s employees’ misappropriating city funds.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Banking Letter]. The Banking Commissioner found that, because Crown was “not primarily engaged in 
the collection of debts from consumer debtors” and received the tax payments “in escrow for subsequent 
distribution to” the City, it was exempt from Connecticut’s licensing and insurance requirements for tax 
collectors. Id.; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-800 (West 2013). 
19
 Press Release, Mayor’s Office, City of New Haven, Conn., State Banking Dept. Upholds City Towing 
Program (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID={5D593739-3F09-
47AF-BF7A-7A3F9E690BD0}.  
20
 Request for Qualifications No. 2014-1-880: Wheel Immobilizer Program from the New Haven, Conn. 
Bureau of Purchases (Jan. 21, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2013 RFQ]. 
21
 Interview with Michael V. Fumiatti, Purchasing Agent, City of New Haven, Conn., in New Haven, 
Conn. (Apr. 8. 2013) [hereinafter Interview with Mr. Fumiatti] (included in appendix).  
7 
 
Part III will then show why competition in the program’s provider market is highly 
unlikely to produce adequate safeguards against this problem. Because Crown does not face a 
credible threat of losing the contract to another vendor, it does not have sufficient incentive to 
develop adequate accountability mechanisms on its own. Part IV, however, will outline how the 
City can develop its own accountability mechanisms and recommend that the City use the 
Requests for Qualifications (RFQ) process to impose these mechanisms on Crown in subsequent 
bargaining rounds. Finally, Part V will offer some concluding remarks on the possibility of in-
sourcing part of the program.  
 
I. The Development of New Haven’s Tax-and-Tow Program 
 
According to the New Haven City Charter, the City’s tax collector is responsible for 
“enforc[ing] payment of all taxes and assessments” owed to the City.
22
 This includes property 
taxes on motor vehicles that are either owned by New Haven residents or garaged within the city 
limits.
23
 Connecticut municipalities have found these taxes notoriously difficult to collect,
24
 and 
indeed New Haven has not been immune to this problem. Prior to 2004, the City relied 
exclusively on phone calls and mailed notices to encourage residents to pay their vehicle taxes.
25
 
Unsurprisingly, these methods were not as successful as the City would have liked. Thus, prior to 
                                                     
22
 NEW HAVEN CITY CHARTER, art. VII, § 31.  
23
 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-71 (West 2013).  
24
 For a more extensive discussion of Connecticut’s motor vehicle taxes, including their history and 
especial unpopularity, see generally Noelle Lyle, Driving Us Crazy: A History and Analysis of New 
Haven’s Personal Property Taxes (May 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Yale Law 
Legal Scholarship Repository), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_legal_history_papers/15. See 
also Keith M. Phaneuf, Lawmakers Put Malloy’s Car Tax Repeal Plan in Neutral, CONN. POST (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/19766/lawmakers-put-malloys-car-tax-repeal-hold (discussing 
Governor Malloy’s recent plan to repeal Connecticut’s motor vehicle taxes). 
25




budgetary year 2004-2005, New Haven regularly posted collection rates around or often 
significantly below 90%, compared to its collection rates for real and personal property taxes 
which have typically exceeded 94% and 98%, respectively.
26
  
However, beginning in 2004, the City decided to harness the power of the tow truck in an 
effort to increase collection rates on delinquent motor vehicle taxes.
27
 Starting that September, 
the City’s Finance Department started “a program of towing parked cars with . . . $100 or more 
in delinquent property taxes.”
28
 The City’s aim was two-fold: (1) to encourage residents, via the 
threat of towing, to pay any back-owed car taxes; and, (2) if that threat failed and the vehicle was 
actually towed, to compel payment before releasing the vehicle to its owner.
29
 At that time 
though, the tax-and-tow program was largely under-developed,
30
 and still used the police 
department’s rotation to assign the required tows.
31
 Since then, however, the program has—to 
quote its architect,
32
 former City Controller Mark Pietrosimone—“‘evolved [in]to . . . a very 
                                                     
26
 See Lyle, supra note 24, at 25.  
27
 Agreement by & Between the City of New Haven, Conn. & Crown Auto Center 1 (Oct. 30, 2009) (on 




 The City had good reason to believe that towing would effectively incentivize residents to pay their 
delinquent bills. Cf. Alexia Brunet Marks & Ronald J. Allen, To Tow or Not To Tow: The Deterrence 
Effect of a Municipal Ordinance, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 1 (2011) (finding that an increased threat of 
towing led to a significant reduction in both the number of parking tickets and even automobile 
accidents).  
30
 Compare Request for Proposals No. 28-12-567: Motor Vehicle Wheel Immobilizers or Wheel Stop 
from the New Haven, Conn. Bureau of Purchases 5 (Dec. 16, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
2007 RFP] (noting that the City “has put together a specific crew of personnel to search out delinquents 
on an infrequent basis” and had identified 2,405 total scofflaws between July 2005 and June 2006), with 
2013 RFQ, at 7 (explaining that the City now had the plate numbers of about 98,000 vehicles on which 
overdue parking tickets were owed).   
31
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Benton, Tow Firms Petition Aldermen Over Rules, NEW HAVEN REG. (Apr. 7, 
2010), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/04/07/news/a3-netowpetition.txt.  
32
 Ed Zack, the City’s Chief Internal Auditor, explained that Mark Pietrosimone deserves the credit for 
developing the Crown program. Interview with Michael O’Neil, Controller, & Ed Zack, Chief Internal 
Auditor, Dep’t of Fin., City of New Haven, Conn. in New Haven, Conn. (Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter 





 In fact, it is so efficient that the City now regularly reports motor vehicle 
tax collection rates above 97%.
34
  
To better understand how this program has “evolved,” this Part will proceed in two 
sections. First, Section A will offer a brief history of the various tax-and-tow programs that 
preceded the contract with Crown: Bootfinder, Plate Hunter, and finally the City’s failed contract 
with VioAlert. Second, Section B will describe the City’s program with Crown: how Crown was 
initially selected, how the current program operates, and finally the City’s plans for working with 
Crown in the future.   
 
A. New Haven’s Predecessor “Tax-and-Tow” Programs 
1. Bootfinder  
In September of 2004, New Haven became the first town in Connecticut—and only the 
second in the country—to employ the “Bootfinder” technology for tax collection purposes.
 35
 
This technology, which was originally designed to help police find stolen cars, gave the City the 
power to locate vehicles on which back taxes were owed.
36
 That September, and then again in 
February and March of 2005, the City deployed towers—via the police rotation—to locate 
scofflaw vehicles using the City-owned Bootfinder technology.
37
 Upon finding a vehicle with tax 
delinquency of $100 or more, the towing company would request that the City’s then-tax 
                                                     
33
 MacMillan, Towing Companies: Prize Contract Breaks Law, supra note 14. 
34
 Mayor’s Office, Proposed Budget: Fiscal Year 2013-2014, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONN. (Mar. 1, 
2013) (“The City’s tax collection rate for FY2012 was 97.84%, a slight decrease from last year’s rate of 
98.00%.”). 
35
 Christoffersen, supra note 25. The first city in the country to use Bootfinder for tax collection purposes 
was Arlington, Virginia; Bridgeport, Connecticut would shortly become the third. Id.  
36
 Id. Tow trucks equipped with the Bootfinder would scan license plate numbers and match them against 
a City-created database. Id.; see also NEWHAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. II, art. IV, § 55 
(Municode 2012) (granting the City to power “to install cumulative delinquent tax register cards for each 
delinquent taxpayer for keeping records to show the amount of the delinquent tax . . . due . . . .”). 
37
 Christoffersen, supra note 25.  
10 
 
collector, C.J. Cuticello, execute a warrant for the outstanding bill; once Mr. Cuticello or his 
designee executed the warrant, the tower could then haul the vehicle to its lot.
38
 The vehicle’s 




As Mr. Cuticello told the Associated Press, this new tax-and-tow program was an 
immediate and radical improvement over the City’s previous collection methods.
 40
 Over the 
course of two deployments, the City had collected more than $1 million in delinquent taxes.
41
 
Thus satisfied with the Bootfinder trial, the City decided not only to continue but also to expand 
the program.
42
 In 2006, the City hired three state marshals to increase the number of officials 
who could execute warrants.
43
 That year, Mr. Cuticello reported that the City collected over $3 
million in delinquent tax bills over another two rounds of two-truck deployments.
44
 Then, in 
August of 2007, the City further expanded the scope of the program to include parking 
delinquents.
 45
 Now, in addition to towing the tax scofflaws, the towing companies were also 
empowered to locate and haul away vehicles on which $200 or more in parking fines were 
owed.
46
 Similarly to a tax delinquent, a parking scofflaw first had pay her fine at the City’s 










 Paul Bass, The Boot Is Back, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/extra_extra/the_boot_is_back [hereinafter 
Bass, The Boot Is Back I]; Paul Bass, The Boot is Back, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Aug. 16, 2007), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/archives/2007/08/the_boot_is_bac_1.php [hereinafter Bass, The 
Boot Is Back II]. 
43
 Bass, The Boot Is Back II, supra note 41.  
44




 Id.  
11 
 





2. Plate Hunter 
During the following deployment, in February of 2008, the City made an important 
technological change to the tax-and-tow program. The City replaced the Bootfinder with a new 
technology—the Plate Hunter—which gave tow trucks to ability not only to scan license plate 
numbers but also to recognize vehicles’ state of registration.
48
 This upgrade was aimed at 
catching scofflaws with out-of-state plates
49
—namely, local university students,
50
 who, if they 
garage their vehicle in New Haven for three or more months at a time, are subject to the same 
vehicle taxes as the City’s more permanent residents.
51
 The idea was that the improved 
capabilities of the Plate Hunter, which also allowed towers to scan twice as many vehicles at 
once, would lead to even higher collection rates.
52
  
Unfortunately though, this new, more aggressive phase of the program encountered some 
problems. Namely, the state marshals, responsible for executing the tax warrants, proved over-
                                                     
47
 Id; Interview with Mr. O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 32.  
48









 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-71(f)(3) (West 2013) (“Any motor vehicle owned by a nonresident of this state . . 
. . shall be set in the list of the town where it is located for the three months or more in such year nearest 
to such assessment day.”). The City contracts with another vendor, Municipal Tax Services, to 
photograph plates and establish the residency of potential out-of-state scofflaws. Interview with Mr. 
O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 32. In the interest of full disclosure, the author has never paid his vehicle 
taxes. So far, the City’s online system indicates, somewhat surprisingly and almost definitely erroneously, 
that he does not owe any. Online Servs., Are You at Risk of Having Your Car Booted or Towed?, CITY OF 
NEW HAVEN, CONN., http://cityofnewhaven.com/lookup/CarTaxesTickets.asp (last visited May 3, 2013).  
52
 Bass, Meet the Plate Hunter, supra note 46.  
12 
 
zealous in their collection tactics.
53
 One marshal in particular, Peter Criscuolo, earned the ire of 
the public when he forced entry into a vehicle on which, it turned out, no back taxes were 
owed.
54
 Later, this same marshal generated even more bad publicity for the program when he 
improperly called off the tow of a politically-connected reverend’s SUV, even though the 
reverend, Boise Kimber, owed back taxes and parking fines on the car.
55
 
In response to these incidents, the Mayor’s Office temporarily suspended the Plate 
Hunter program.
56
 In addition, the City ordered the state marshals to attend “sensitivity training” 
before the program could resume.
57
 The Board of Alderman, however, was not satisfied with this 
solution and, in May of 2008, ultimately decided to remove the state marshals from the program 





In a further response to the public growing discontent with the program, the City also 
decided to relax the towing procedure for parking scofflaws. In May of 2008, the City contracted 
with VioAlert, a Georgia-based company, to boot, but not immediately tow, vehicles found with 
                                                     
53
 See, e.g., Melissa Bailey, Third Towing Scrape Detailed, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 24, 2008) 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/third_towing_scrape_detailed (describing 
two incidents in which state marshal Peter Criscuolo tried to serve warrants for taxes that had already 




 Melissa Bailey, Kimber Gets Off the (Towing) Hook, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 8, 2008), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/kimber_gets_off_the_towing_hook.  
56
 Paul Bass, Towing Program Halted, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 11, 2008), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/archives/2008/04/towing_program.php.  
57
 Paul Bass, Marshals Sent to School, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 30, 2008), 
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/archives/2008/04/post_359.php. The City also instituted a new 
grievance procedure via the Police Commission to handle towing-related complaints. Id.  
58








 Under this reformed system, VioAlert would locate and then affix 
wheel immobilizers to parking fine delinquent vehicles; the parking scofflaw then had 12 hours 
to pay her debt before VioAlert would sub-contract with one of the City’s towers to haul away 
the car.
60
 Writing in the New Haven Independent, Paul Bass hailed the use of booting as a 
“customer-friendly” alternative to towing.
61
 
However, although the use of the boot helped reduce the number of tows—and thus 
reduce the number of City residents displeased with the program—VioAlert found that it could 
not continue operating in New Haven.
62
 When asked why his company had decided to leave, 
Vioalert’s CEO Ken Faerber explained that “[b]oot fees around the country are three times”
63
 the 
$55 that the City then—and now—allows companies to collect for booting.
64
 Thus, finding the 









                                                     
59
 Bass, VioAlert Bags the Boot, supra note 8. The City announced its intent “to contract with a vendor, 
who has expertise in this field, to perform all necessary tasks relevant to the use of wheel immobilizers in 
the [parking] scofflaw program” on December 16, 2007 via the Request for Proposals process. 2007 RFP, 
supra note 30, at 5. By the end of the bidding period on January 22, 2008, the City had received only two 
proposals – one from Columbus Auto Body, which was non-responsive, and one from VioAlert. 
Memorandum from Bureau of Purchases, New Haven, Conn. on Wheel Immobilizer/Wheelstop 28-12-
567 (Jan. 22, 2008) (on file with author).  
60
 Interview with Mr. Fumiatti, supra note 21.  
61
 Paul Bass, Marshals Sent to School, supra note 57. 
62




 NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. III, art. V, § 29-119(f) (Municode 2012) (The fee for 
application and removal of a vehicle impound boot shall be fifty-five dollars ($55.00).).  
65
 Bass, VioAlert Bags the Boot, supra note 8 
14 
 
B. Crown’s Contract 
1. The 2009 RFP 
Both in anticipation of VioAlert’s exit and in a further attempt to reform its tax-and-tow 
program, the City released a new Request for Proposals on September 13, 2009.
 66
 With the RFP, 
the City indicated that it was seeking a vendor that could “perform all the necessary tasks 
relevant to the use of wheel immobilizers in the scofflaw program.”
67
 The Bureau of Purchases 
explained that the City would “[i]deally” contract with a single vendor who would locate, boot, 
and, if necessary, tow all vehicles on which either overdue parking fines or back taxes were 
owed.
68
 Furthermore, the vendor would also be expected to collect and hold delinquent vehicle 
taxes for the City.
69
 Finally, the City expressed preference for a vendor that could collect these 
payments and return vehicles after normal business hours, 7 days a week.
70
 
The reaction from potential bidders was mixed. Although the RFP kept open the 
possibility of the City using multiple towers,
71
 many towers expressed concern about the City’s 
decision not to continue using the rotation.
72
 In addition, an unidentified vendor took issue with 
the RFP’s preference for a vendor that could process payments “24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
                                                     
66
 2009 RFP, supra note 9, at 6. Per the New Haven City Charter, art. VII, § 74(b) (“Whenever any work 
is necessary to be done . . . . [a]ll such contracts shall be . . . made in compliance with public notice 
published at least ten days before the time fixed for opening said bids or proposals.”), the Bureau of 
Purchases posted the RFP notice in both the Sunday edition of the New Haven Register and on their 
online procurement database. Interview with Mr. Fumiatti, supra note 21.  
67
 2009 RFP, supra note 9, at 6. 
68
 Id.  
69




 Id. at 6 (“[V]endor will arrange for the vehicle to be removed (towed) from the street either through 
their own towing service or through a towing service that they have subcontracted this work through . . . 
.”). 
72
 Interview with Mr. O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 46. Mr. O’Neil said there was a rumor that many of 
the towing companies had collectively decided not to bid in a failed attempt to compel the City to 
continue using the rotation. Id. Obviously, if such an agreement actually existed, Crown did not follow it. 
See also Towing Petition, supra note 13 (explaining the complaining towers’ concerns with Crown’s 
“monopoly” contract).  
15 
 
365 days a year.”
73
 In response, Michael Fumiatti, the City’s Purchasing Agent, explained that, 
although it was the City’s “ideal desire” that the vendor could handle payments after hours, 
“should a respondent to this solicitation not be able to provide such service; it does not preclude 
them from submitting and having their proposal favorably submitted.”
74
  
Despite Mr. Fumiatti’s efforts to clarify that after-hours collection would not be 
mandatory, the RFP generated only three responses.
75
 Moreover, two of these so-called 
proposals—one from New Jersey-based PayLock, and the other from local tower Columbus 
Auto Body—were non-responsive,
76
 although Columbus’s owner, Vin DiLauro, would later 
claim that his proposal was intended to preserve the towing rotation for tax-related tows.
77
  
Crown’s proposal, on the other hand, was responsive.
78
 In a one-page “Statement of 
Proposal,” Crown’s owner, Albert Hansen, outlined the basics of what would become the current 
tax-and-tow program: that Crown would locate, boot, and, when necessary, tow all scofflaw 
vehicles, as “identified by the City.”
79
 In addition, Crown offered to “make available . . . a 
customer service payment center,” where it would serve as a bill collection agent at hours to be 
determined by the City.
80
 On these general terms, the City decided to award the program to 
                                                     
73
 Memorandum from Michael V. Fumiatti to Potential Bidders (Sept. 25, 2009) (on file with author). 
74
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with author) [hereinafter Crown’s Response to RFP No. 29-9-675]. 
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 and, on October 30, 2009, the two parties entered into a formal agreement.
82
 According 
that contract’s terms, the City “reserve[d] the right, at its sole option and discretion, to renew 
[the] Agreement for three additional one year periods, at similar terms and conditions.”
83
 The 





2. The Current Tax-and-Tow Program 
Although Crown’s contract has changed in some substantive ways over the four contract 
periods—spanning from October 30, 2009 to today
85
—the basics of the City-Crown program 
remain the same. Using an electronic database maintained by the Tax Collector and the 
Collections Receivable unit, Crown’s tow trucks drive through New Haven’s streets, scanning 
license plates in an effort to locate motor vehicle tax and parking tag delinquents.
86
 To help 
ensure that Crown only boots or tows vehicles with ongoing delinquencies, Crown receives an 
updated version of this database at the start of every business day.
87
 As a further safeguard, if the 
Tax Collector’s Office is still open when Crown locates a potentially delinquent vehicle, the tow 
truck driver must call to confirm that the bill remains unpaid before applying the boot or 
deciding to tow.
88
   
Depending on the nature of the bill, Crown must then follow one of three procedures: 
                                                     
81
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82
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83
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84
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the City in subsequent bargaining rounds, see infra text accompanying notes181-88.  
86
 Crown Agreement No. 1, supra note 10, app. A.  
87
 Interview with Mr. O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 32.  
88
 Id.  
17 
 
1) If only overdue parking fines (between $200 and $400) are owed, Crown must boot 
the vehicle and attach a windshield notice, which explains how the owner can pay his 
delinquency.
 89
 If the owner makes payment within the allotted time—12 hours—
Crown is responsible for retrieving the boot.
 90
 If, however, the owner fails to make 
payment, Crown may tow the vehicle to its lot at 388 Crown St.
 91
 In the event that 
Crown locates a vehicle on which more than $400 in overdue parking is owed, Crown 
may automatically tow without first booting.
92
 
2) If only delinquent taxes are owed (of $100 or more), Crown generally must boot the 
vehicle, wait the allotted 12 hours, and then only tow if necessary, according to the 
procedures outlined above.
 93
 However, during two periods each year—typically 
between September 1 and November 30 and then again between March 1 and May 
30—Crown instead automatically tows without booting.
 94
  
3) Finally, if both back taxes (of $100 or more) and back parking fines (of $200 or 
more) are owed, the procedure for delinquent taxes takes precedence such that Crown 
can tow automatically without booting during the designated time periods.
95
 
To retrieve a vehicle that has been towed, the owner must first pay the delinquency, 
including the necessary booting and/or towing fees. During the City’s operating hours—
currently, Monday to Friday, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.—the owner must make these payments 
                                                     
89
 Crown Agreement No. 4, supra note 84, app. C.  
90
 Id.  
91
 Id.; see also infra Figure 1 (showing Crown’s location).  
92
 Crown Agreement No. 4, supra note 84, app. C. Note that this $400 threshold is lower than the $500 
threshold in effect during the previous three contract periods. Compare id. with Agreement by & Between 
the City of New Haven, Conn. & Crown Auto Center, app C. (July 1, 2011) (on file with the author) 
[hereinafter Crown Agreement No. 3]; see also infra text accompanying note 188 (discussing this change 
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93
 Crown Agreement No. 4, supra note 84, app. A.   
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 Id.   
95
 Id. at app. C.  
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directly to the City, at either the Collections Receivable Unit or the Tax Office, which are both 
located at 165 Church St.
96
 These payments may be made in cash or via MasterCard or Visa.
97
 
Upon receipt of payment, the City presents the vehicle owner with a release form, which she can 
then use to retrieve the vehicle from Crown’s lot.
98
 Later, after a monthly accounting, the City 
disburses to Crown any booting and towing fees it has collected.
99
 
If, however, the owner wants to pay after hours, she must pay the amount of her 
outstanding bill, plus the booting and towing fees, directly to Crown.
100
 Previously, Crown could 
accept only cash, but has recently been allowed to also accept MasterCard and Visa, as long as 
the presented credit card bears the name of the vehicle owner.
101
 Upon receipt of payment, 
Crown then releases the vehicle to its owner and must disburse any collected taxes or parking 




3. The 2013 RFQ: A Plan for the Future 
With its agreement with Crown set on expire on June 30, 2013, the City recently 
announced its intention to continue the tax-and-tow program.
 103
 On January 21, 2013, the City’s 
Bureau of Purchases released a Request for Qualifications for a program remarkably similar to 
its current arrangement with Crown.
 104
 In response, the City received two bids—one from 
Crown and one from another local tower, Tony’s Long Wharf—but, citing both Crown’s 
                                                     
96
 Dep’t of Transp., Traffic & Parking, Got Towed?, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONN. (last visited Apr. 16, 
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101
 Interview with Mr. O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 32. 
102
 Crown Agreement No. 1, supra note 10, app. A. 
103
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19 
 
reputation for good service and its more central location as convenient for vehicle owners, the 
City ultimately decided to re-award the contract to Crown.
105
 As of this writing, the City is 




II. A Preliminary Assessment: Early Benefits, But A Major Weakness Remains 
 
As indicated by its decision to re-award the contract, the City is very satisfied with 
Crown’s performance and with the current tax-and-tow program, in general.
107
 Indeed, since the 
inception of the program, collection rates for both delinquent motor vehicle taxes and overdue 
parking fines have dramatically increased. As noted above, the City now regularly posts 
collection rates for vehicle taxes around or above 97%.
108
 Moreover, the City has also repeatedly 
stressed that the program requires no direct remuneration to Crown (though the City does pay to 
maintain the scofflaw database and provide Crown with the requisite plate-scanning 
technology).
109
 It thus appears, as former Controller Mark Pietrosimone has said, that the City 
has a “very efficient” program with Crown.
110
 
However, as many commentators have noted, efficiency is not the only criterion we 
should use to evaluate government contracts.
111
 Instead, as the late political scientist James Q. 
                                                     
105
 Id. Mr. O’Neil and Mr. Zack stressed, however, that no single factor was determinative in their 




 Interview with Mr. O’Neil & Mr. Zack, supra note 32; see also Crown Agreement No. 4, supra note 
84, at 2 (“[T]he City is satisfied with the Contractor’s performance of its duties under the Original 
Agreement and subsequent agreements entered into with the Contractor for fiscal years ending June 30, 
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(emphasis added).   
108
 See supra note 33. 
109
 E.g., Crown Agreement No. 3, supra note 92, at 4; see also 2013 RFQ, supra note 20, at 8 (explaining 
that the City provides the plate-scanning technology). 
110
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111
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Wilson has explained, “government has many [other] valued outputs, including a reputation for 
integrity [and] the confidence of the people . . . .”
 112
  Although it is exceedingly difficult to 
“measure” these outputs,
113
 this Part will use these criteria to provide a preliminary assessment 
of the Crown contract as compared to its predecessor programs.  
To that end, this Part will explain how the decision to consolidate three previously 
separate services—booting, towing, and after-hours delinquent bill collection—into a single-
provider contract award has improved both the program’s reputation and its actual fairness to 
City residents in two significant ways. First, Section A will explain how consolidation allowed 
the City to continue and expand the use of booting as a “customer-friendly” alternative to 
towing. Second, Section B will explain how consolidation to a single provider also allowed the 
City to offer 24/7 payment collection and vehicle retrieval as a convenience for vehicle owners. 
Despite these improvements, however, the current tax-and-tow program still suffers from a 
substantial weakness. As Section C will explain, the current program does not provide adequate 
safeguards against Crown’s employees’ misappropriating funds owed the City, and this 






                                                                                                                                                                           
exacerbated by the complexity of any given government tasks beyond simple efficacy of service or 
product delivery.”).  
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A. A First Improvement: The Continued and Expanded Use of Booting as an Alternative 
to Towing 
Booting, even for the relatively short period of 12 hours,
114
 provides a “customer-
friendly” alternative to towing.
115
 While sharing towing’s key strength for the purposes of this 
program—that it is sufficiently inconvenient to compel payment of delinquent bills—booting can 
reduce the aggregate hardship a vehicle owner must experience to regain use of her car. Simply 
put, if the owner pays within the allotted time, she will pay a smaller financial penalty and waste 
less time retrieving the vehicle than if it had been towed.
116
 
At least in New Haven, however, booting does not appear to be viable as a stand-alone 
contract. Previously, VioAlert had found that providing booting services at the City-set rate was 
insufficiently profitable.
117
 Moreover, Crown appears to have also believed that providing 
booting alone would not have been profitable, as it did not even bid on the 2008 RFP that 
generated the City’s contract with VioAlert.
118
 It thus seems highly unlikely the City could have 




But the contract award for booting, when coupled with the award for towing, was 
lucrative enough to attract not only Crown but also other vendors to bid for the program. In other 
words, although booting alone might still be a losing proposition, towing must at least be 
                                                     
114
 See, e.g., Booting, Towing, and Impoundment, PHILA. PARKING AUTH. (last visited Apr. 30, 2013), 
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profitable enough to subsidize any losses Crown incurs in providing the City with sufficient 
boots. (In fact, Crown’s towing award appears to be so profitable that it originally offered to 
perform the perform booting services at a rate of $42 per vehicle, $13 less than the ordinance-
limited rate that VioAlert did not find sufficiently profitable.
 120
) 
Thus, the consolidation of booting and towing into a single contract award has made the 
continued use of booting possible. Indeed, in the current program, Crown uses booting not only 
for parking-related delinquencies, as VioAlert had before, but also for some tax-related 
delinquencies (i.e., when not towing automatically during the two City-authorized 
deployments).
121
 This increased use of the boot, as an alternative to immediate towing, has very 
likely had and will continue to have a positive effect on the program’s reputation among New 
Haven residents. 
  
B. A Second Improvement: Making 24/7 Payment Collection and Vehicle Retrieval 
Possible 
In a similar vein, consolidation of the entire contract into a single award appears to have 
made possible another “customer-friendly” improvement to the program. Under the program’s 
previous iterations, vehicle owners were not able to pay their delinquent bills after hours and thus 
could not retrieve their vehicles when the City’s offices were closed, unless they had previously 
paid and obtained a release form during business hours.
122
 Indeed, in the worst case scenario, a 
resident whose vehicle was towed on Friday evening would not be able make payment, let alone 
                                                     
120
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retrieve her car, until the following Monday morning. Obviously, this posed a major 
inconvenience to scofflaws unfortunate enough to be towed after hours.
123
 
 Solving this problem thus became a focus of the City’s 2009 RFP.
124
 As recounted above, 
the RFP expressed preference for vendors that could collect payments “during all non City 
business hours, so that the City can operate this program seven days per week, all day.”
125
 But, 
as the response to the RFP indicates, maintaining an after-hours collection center appears to be 
an expensive proposition for towing companies.
126
 Indeed, one vendor told Mr. Fumiatti, the 
City’s purchasing agent, that it could not submit a bid precisely because the RFP “call[ed] for” 
this feature.
127
 It appears, then, that even the award of all towing and booting fees for the entire 
program would have been insufficient to justify this vendor expending the resources necessary to 
main an after-hours collection center.  Moreover, even Crown seemed reticent to commit to 
after-hours collection. In its response to the RFP, Crown offered to “make available . . . a 
customer service payment center . . . . [at] hours [that] will be determined by the City of New 
Haven,” but did not specifically list its ability to make that center “available” 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week, 365 days a year.
 128
  
 Eventually, of course, Crown did commit to an always-available collection center.
129
 
However, the City’s experience with the 2009 RFP strongly suggests that maintaining the 
payment center was a point of difficulty for potential bidders and possibly even for Crown. Thus, 
it is reasonable to infer that the award of all towing and booting fees for the entire program was 
                                                     
123
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124
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necessary to attract a private vendor that would be willing to keep the center open according to 
the City’s needs. In other words, it is highly unlikely that the City could have found multiple 
vendors willing to maintain after-hours collection centers 7 days a week, with each vendor 
receiving only a fraction of the contract award.  
 Consolidation has thus allowed the City to make a major improvement to its tax-and-tow 
program. Rightfully hailed by the program’s architect, Mr. Pietrosimone, 24/7 vehicle retrieval is 
“intended for the convenience of the taxpayer” and thus likely to benefit the program’s 
reputation and residents’ confidence (even if only marginally) in the ability of city government to 




C. A Major Weakness: Inadequate Safeguards Against Employees’ Misappropriating City 
Funds 
 Despite the improvements described above, the City’s current arrangement with Crown 
suffers from at least one substantial weakness—the absence of adequate safeguards to protect 
against the company’s drivers’ misappropriating City funds. Recently, after an unfortunate 
incident, this weakness received considerable attention in the local press.
131
 On the evening of 
October 22, 2013, Robyn Handy and her daughter, Rojonna, went to Crown’s lot to retrieve their 
vehicle, which had been towed earlier that day for a supposedly outstanding vehicle tax bill.
132
 
However, according to the elder Ms. Handy, she had already paid the bill one month earlier, 
when one of Crown’s tow truck drivers had told her he could accept payment in lieu of towing 
                                                     
130
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131
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 Ms. Handy claimed that she had paid that driver the full amount of the delinquency—
$159—and, in return, the driver had given her a handwritten receipt on a copy of his business 
card.
134
 This time though, when another of Crown’s drivers came to tow her car for the same bill, 
she presented him with the receipt, but this driver, confirming that the delinquency still existed 




 Now, Ms. Handy and her daughter had arrived at Crown’s lot both to protest the tow and 
with the hope of reclaiming their vehicle.
136
 There, they encountered Crown’s clerk, Ruth 
Zalabarria, who told them that no record of their supposed payment existed.
137
 Ms. Zalabarria 
went on to explain that Crown’s drivers were not authorized to accept bill payments and any 
such business card receipt, if it ever existed, had since been lost.
138
 She then asked that, if they 
were not going to pay the bill and requisite towing fee now, Ms. Handy and her daughter leave 




 Unfortunately, the situation then took a turn for the worse. Unsatisfied with Ms. 
Zalabarria’s response and refusal to release the vehicle, Ms. Handy’s daughter entered the car 
and attempted to drive out of the lot, but Ms. Zalabarria refused to open the gate.
 140
 Now, even 
further enraged, Ms. Handy’s daughter exited the vehicle and, in an ensuing scuffle, pushed Ms. 
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Zalabarria, then eight-months pregnant, from behind.
141
 Luckily, another Crown employee was 
able to break up the fight, but—after video surveillance footage confirmed Ms. Zalabarria’s 
account of the incident
142
—both Ms. Handy and her daughter were arrested for assault and 
trespassing, and the at-issue vehicle was taken into police custody.
143
  
 Only two days later, however, Ms. Handy and her daughter returned to Crown’s lot to 
protest both their arrests and their alleged mistreatment by the company.
144
 This time, however, 
they did not come alone but instead were joined by Reverend Donald Morris, the activist pastor 
of Life Kingdom Ministries, and some two dozen other supporters.
145
 As Rev. Morris explained, 
they had organized to protest the “illegal practice” of one of Crown’s drivers: “pocketing money 
given for unpaid taxes.”
146
 Speaking to reporters, Rev. Morris further “called on the City to 
investigate Crown’s towing practices and to cease its contract with the company.”
147
 
 In the resulting investigation, the City’s police department found that Crown did indeed 
have Ms. Handy’s “receipt.”
148
 In fact, the police found the business card, which indicated the 
amount of back taxes that Ms. Handy had originally owed, torn to pieces in a company 
wastebasket.
149
 Although Crown first attempted to explain away the business card as a 
“courteous” reminder to Ms. Handy of what she owed,
150
 one of Crown’s drivers, Jonathan 
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Esposito, eventually confessed to scamming city bill-payers.
151
 As Mr. Esposito explained, he 
would accept “payment” in cash in exchange for not towing the vehicle but then pocket that 
money, instead of returning it to Crown or the City—such that the delinquency would remain 
unpaid in city records.
152
 The police also found that, in addition to Ms. Handy, he had, on that 
very same day alone, run the same scam on two other hapless vehicle owners, who, like Ms. 
Handy, had their vehicles subsequently towed and had to pay their back taxes a second time.
153
  
 It thus appears that the other eight towing companies, who originally petitioned the City 
to block the program, may have been right in at least one aspect of their complaint: the City’s 
current arrangement with Crown does not adequately safeguard against the “misappropriation” 
of taxpayer money or funds owed the City.
 154
 Under the current system, it is too easy for 
Crown’s drivers to take advantage of unfortunate vehicle owners, who both are desperate to 
prevent their cars from being towed and likely unaware that these drivers should not be accepting 
payment. This is not to say, of course, that Crown’s employees will typically or even likely 
engage in such a scam, but relying on their good intentions is, in the words of the other towers’ 
petition, “manifestly unwise.”
155
 These types of incidents may result not only in the loss of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
manager, Angel Rivera, suggested that Ms. Handy had likely altered the card to indicate payment. He 
continued:  
People are always offering to pay on the street, [but] we tell them go to city hall. We 
hand out business cards to thousands of people and tell them this is what you owe, to be 
courteous, so we don’t get into a problem on the streets. They go on ahead and modify 
the card if they want, but we know that we hand out receipts here from the city, or the 
city hands them out also. 
Id. Hansen ultimately admitted to tearing up the business card because he knew it might be fraudulent. 
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taxpayer and city funds but also threaten to damage the program’s reputation among all New 
Haven residents.  
 
III. Inadequate Competition in the Tax-and-Tow Provider Market: Lacking a Credible 
Threat of Contract Turnover 
Under a traditional conception of government contracting, the City of New Haven could 
rely on the competitive forces of the provider market—that is, among towing companies able to 
bid on the tax-and-tow program—to help cure the program’s employee accountability 
problems.
156
 As Professor Amanda M. Girth and her colleagues explain in their 2012 survey of 
local government contracting decisions, “market theory tells us that competition fosters . . . 
quality control because there are punitive consequences to inefficient behavior—namely, the 
purchaser’s selection of another supplier to provide the good or service.”
157
 Following this logic, 
the City would benefit from competitive pressures in the provider market for the tax-and-tow 
award. That is, Crown, fearing the possibility of losing its award at subsequent bargaining 
rounds, would likely develop its own internal mechanisms to ensure that employee misbehavior 
did not cause the City to choose another provider. Crown could, for instance, develop a more 
rigorous system for hiring and retaining employees, or deploy dashboard monitoring systems to 
record employee conduct. 
                                                     
156
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Unfortunately though, as Girth et al. find in many other local government service 
provider markets,
158
 there does not appear to be sufficient competition in the tax-and-tow 
provider market to generate a credible threat that Crown could lose the contract. Absent this 
threat, Crown is unlikely to independently develop employee accountability mechanisms strong 
enough to protect the program’s reputation.
159
 Indeed, the following sections will show that 
Crown faces woefully little competition from other potential providers. Section A will show that, 
because of the lack of price competition for the service, vendors are largely competing on 
location, where Crown enjoys a substantial—and, at least for now, insurmountable—advantage. 
Next, Section B will describe how, as the award’s first recipient, Crown enjoys a further 
advantage over potential market entrants. Because of these advantages, Crown does not face a 
credible threat of contract turnover and thus enjoys significant bargaining power in its 
relationship with the City. In fact, as Section C will show, Crown has already exercised this 
power in earlier bargaining rounds and indeed, in its current round of negotiations, is looking to 
further exercise this power on the very issue of employee accountability.  
 
A. Limited Competition in the Provider Market: Crown’s Advantage in Location 
Although there are eight towing companies currently active on the City’s rotation,
160
 
there have been surprisingly few bids for the tax-and-tow award. As recounted above, for both 
the 2009 RFP and the 2013 RFQ, only two New Haven-based outfits, including Crown, 
                                                     
158
 Id. at 887 (“‘[T]hin’ provider markets . . . for government contracts are a common problem.”).  
159
 While Crown’s ownership does have an incentive—in the form of the $77 towing fee—to ensure that 
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submitted proposals to the City.
161




At first, this lack of vendor interest may seem puzzling,
163
 but a more careful 
consideration of what the City was looking for—at both procurement rounds—sheds light on the 
likely reason more towing companies did not bid. As the City’s purchasing agent, Michael 
Fumiatti, explained in an interview, because the prices for booting and towing are set by city 
ordinance, vendors submitting bids for the tax-and-tow program are largely competing on 
intangibles, which can make their proposals difficult to assess.
164
 However, bidders are 
competing on at least one tangible characteristic: as the City Controller Michael O’Neil and 
Chief Internal Auditor Ed Zack explained in a subsequent interview, potential program vendors 
are competing on location.
165
 
As it turns out, location of the retrieval lot is a key component of the program’s 
convenience for taxpayers.
166
 City residents whose cars have been towed often do not have 
another vehicle to use and therefore must walk, bike, or take public transit to go reclaim their 
vehicle. As Mr. Zack further explained, Crown’s lot—at 388 Crown St.—is centrally located in 
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Fig. 1: New Haven’s Towing Companies. Each yellow star indicates one 
of the towing companies on the police department’s rotation (Note though 
that the two towers in Quinnipiac Meadows—Anthony’s High-Tech and 
Lombard Motors—are located next door to each other, so it is difficult to 
see both stars on the map.). The blue flag indicates Crown’s highly 
advantageous location downtown. 
 
the City and thus, compared to the other towers, provides the most convenient place for vehicle 
retrieval for the largest number of City residents.
167
 Figure 1 best illustrates this point:  
 
Indeed, Mr. Zack confirmed that, although no single factor was determinative, Crown’s location 
was central to the City’s decision to re-award the contract via the recent 2013 RFQ.
168
 
 Moreover, Crown is not likely to lose this substantial advantage anytime soon. Even if 
another interested vendor wanted to invest in a towing lot with a comparable location to Crown, 
it is highly unlikely that the vendor could obtain approval from the City’s Board of Zoning 
Appeals. As Officer Francis Lombardi, the head of the police department’s municipal towing 







unit, explained in another interview, the Board of Zoning Appeals is not currently inclined to 
grant the necessary variances to towing companies that want to operate downtown.
169
 In fact, 
even Crown has experienced related difficulties with the Board. In May 2007, Crown applied for 
a Use Variance to permit the warehousing of vehicles at its 10 Olive St. location;
170
 the Board, 
however, denied the application.
171
  
 Thus, with its substantial advantage in location unlikely to disappear, Crown currently 
experiences little, if any, competitive pressure from the provider market.  
 
B. Limited Competition in the Provider Market: Crown’s First-Recipient Advantage 
 Moreover, as the award’s first recipient, Crown enjoys another substantial advantage over 
other potential providers.
172
 As many researchers have noted, local governments have a tendency 
to “settle” on service providers after a single round of procurement and then select them again in 
subsequent rounds.
173
 Local governments “settle” for two reasons. First, institutional resource 
constraints may prevent city purchasing departments from extensive evaluation of alternative 
providers and thus incentivize against taking risks on relatively unknown vendors.
174
 Second, 
                                                     
169
 Interview with Officer Lombardi, supra note 6. Officer Lombardi’s familiarity with the Board of 
Zoning Appeals stems from his review of towers’ applications to join the police department’s rotation. Id. 
As part of the application process, a towing company must prove that it has a minimum of 100 spots to 
store vehicles within the City limits. NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, tit. III, art. V, § 29-
118(b)(6) (Municode 2012).  To prove this, the tower must submit to an inspection from a zoning 
enforcement officer. § 29-110 (“After receipt of an application, the chief of police shall . . . . transmit a 
copy of the application to the zoning enforcement officer for his review.”).  
170
 Agenda: Public Hearing to Be Held by New Haven Bd. of Zoning Appeals (Apr. 10, 2007), 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/uploads/BZA%20Agenda%204-10-07.pdf.  
171
 City Notice: Bd. of Zoning Appeals Decisions (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/uploads/BZA%20Decisions%205-8-07.pdf.  
172
 This includes the 2013 RFQ round.  
173
 Ernita M. Joaquin & Thomas J. Greitens, Contract Management Capacity Breakdown? An Analysis of 
Local Governments, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 807, 813 (2012).  
174
 See id. (suggesting that “local governments [may] have lost the capacity and temerity to seek better 
service providers . . . .”).  
33 
 
depending on the nature of the provided service, switching providers may require substantial 
investments that a city is not willing to make.  
 Both of these reasons appear to be present here. As to the first, the New Haven Bureau of 
Purchases appears to face resource constraints in evaluating the tax-and-tow program proposals. 
As the City’s purchasing agent, Michael Fumiatti, explained in an interview, these types of 
proposals—as opposed to bids—are very difficult to assess because they cannot be evaluated on 
the objective criterion of price.
175
 It thus seems likely that the City—to avoid the significant costs 
of evaluation—would be more inclined to go with the “safe” choice of an incumbent provider. 
Even if that provider has had performance issues, at least the City already has information about 
its performance and can thus prepare for potential problems.
176
 Indeed, the City appears to 
practice this relatively “safe” approach to procurement. As Mr. Fumiatti explained, out of all the 
City’s vendor contracts, it only declines one to two options to renew each year.
177
 
 Second, as to the program’s start-up costs, the City expended significant resources in 
training Crown staff to interface with the Tax Office’s delinquency database and to accept 
delinquency payments.
178
 Although this training is ongoing,
179
 it consisted largely of a 
significant initial investment by relevant city officials.
180
 If, at a later procurement round, the 
City wanted to select another vendor, it would have to consider the costs of switching to an un-
trained provider. As these costs appear to be substantial, the City seems sufficiently dis-
incentivized against choosing a new vendor for the tax-and-tow program—at least as long as 
Crown’s training in the relevant technology remains valuable.  
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 Thus, because of its limited capacity to evaluate new, unknown vendors, and the 
significant costs of switching to a new provider, the City appears to have “settled” on Crown for 
the foreseeable future. Crown, therefore, enjoys significant advantages over other potential 
vendors from both its physical location in downtown New Haven and the City’s inclination 
towards re-hiring incumbent firms.  
 
C. Crown’s Substantial Bargaining Power: Evidence from Past and Present Negotiations 
Because of these substantial advantages, Crown does not currently face a credible threat 
of losing the tax-and-tow program award. Crown, therefore, can exercise significant bargaining 
power in its relationship with the City. In fact, over previous bargaining rounds, Crown has 
already exercised this power to obtain at least three advantageous changes to the City’s planned 
program. First, during the 2009 RFP negotiations, Crown was able to gain an additional renewal 
option in the program agreement. The City had proposed only two renewal options in the RFP,
181
 
but Crown successfully negotiated that a third be added to the contract.
182
 As explained above, 
the City rarely declines these options,
183
 so Crown was smart to negotiate an additional one.
184
 
Second, and also during the 2009 RFP negotiations, Crown was able to earn a higher booting fee 
than even it had originally proposed. In its response to the RFP, Crown had proposed a booting 
rate of $42 per vehicle.
185
 Crown, however, clearly overestimated its need to bid low and, thus, 
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realizing its mistake in subsequent negotiations, was able to raise the rate upwards to the 
maximum allowed by city ordinance.
186
 Third, in more recent bargaining between renewal 
periods, Crown was also able to lower the threshold amount for which it could automatically tow 
vehicles with delinquent parking fines—from $500 to $400.
187
 This is particularly advantageous 
to Crown because towing is typically more lucrative than booting.
188
 Thus, Crown, in the 
absence of viable competitors, has been able to modify the City’s plans for the program.  
Now, unfortunately, Crown has attempted to use its negotiating leverage to stop the 
City’s attempts at promoting employee accountability.
189
 As part of the 2013 RFQ negotiations, 
the City has proposed affixing a label to all Crown tow trucks that would prominently indicate 
that Crown employees cannot accept payments.
190
 As of this writing, however, Crown has met 
this proposal with resistance. Although Crown’s owner, Mr. Hansen, claims that the label would 
pose undue hardship to his employees, who are authorized to collect payments for private 
tows,
191
 this resistance—and indeed Crown’s very ability to resist—is a worrying indicator of the 
company’s market power and the possibility that accountability issues will only become more 
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IV. Developing and Implementing Effective Accountability Mechanisms: An Alternative 
to Competition 
Thus, at least for now, Crown appears immune from any competitive pressures in the 
provider market. The City, therefore, will not be able to rely on competition among potential 
vendors to incentivize Crown to develop adequate employee accountability mechanisms on its 
own. Instead, the City will need to focus its resources on developing these mechanisms in-house 
and work—to the greatest extent possible—to impose these measures on Crown in subsequent 
bargaining rounds.
192
 This Part will outline a strategy for designing and implementing such 
accountability measures. First, Section A will describe two measures that could directly improve 
employee accountability and help avoid the type of misappropriation of City funds described 
above.
193
 Then, Section B will explain two ways the City could improve its ability to develop 
further accountability mechanisms. Finally, Section C will recommend a strategy for imposing 
these mechanisms on Crown, despite the company’s substantial bargaining power.  
 
A. Two Measures to Improve Employee Accountability 
In addition to the warning label that the City is currently negotiating with Crown,
194
 the 
City could also attempt to negotiate the adoption of at least two other accountability mechanisms 
aimed at solving the specific problem of driver accountability. First, the City could seek to 
require further qualifications for drivers working on delinquency-related tows. For example, the 
City could request background checks or attempt to require that these drivers either hold some 
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number of years of experience with Crown, or have the same number of years of experience at 
another towing operator and can provide references to establish their past performance.
195
 
Currently, the City’s arrangement with Crown requires only that drivers not currently be “serving 
a sentence in a penal or correctional institute . . . .”
196
 Although such a mechanism would be far 
from perfect—as an employee’s past performance may be both difficult to determine and not 
always the best predictor of future behavior—it would still be an improvement over the current 
system. In other words, it would substantially reduce the risk of employee misconduct.  
Second, and even more promisingly, the City could seek to require that Crown maintain a 
two-way datastream with the City. Currently, the City sends an updated list of delinquent license 
plates to Crown each morning,
197
 but Crown does not send its scanning data back to the City.  
The City thus runs the risk that Crown finds a match and, then, for one of two reasons, does not 
tow the vehicle. The first would be wholly legitimate. Indeed, as the City’s contract with Crown 
outlines, Crown must, “to avoid confrontation with irate taxpayers, pass on a vehicle that may 
cause a confrontation.”
198
 Crown is then supposed to log and report such incidents to the Tax 
Office.
199
 But the second reason would not be legitimate: that a taxpayer has paid the driver not 
to tow—whether because she believes she is paying her delinquency, as in the case of Ms. 
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A two-way datastream, however, would reduce the chance of illegitimate decisions not to 
tow. The City would now have a record of every interaction between Crown’s drivers and 
delinquent vehicles. If a vehicle owner in Ms. Handy’s situation, for instance, wanted to protest a 
tow, the City could check whether there was a previous record of Crown’s scanners finding her 
vehicle and then not subsequently towing. If, furthermore, there was no report that Ms. Handy 
had confronted the driver, such that he did not follow through with the tow, the City would have 
considerable evidence that one of Crown’s drivers had engaged in foul play. Obviously, drivers 
could falsify confrontation reports, but both the City and Crown would have more information 





B. Developing Further Accountability Mechanisms  
In addition to attempting to implement the accountability described mechanisms above, 
the City should also work continually to develop additional and better accountability 
mechanisms—aimed both at the problem of employee misbehavior and improving Crown’s 
general contract performance. To develop these mechanisms, the City should two steps. First, the 
City should expend administrative resources to routinize the complaint system for the entire 
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 Currently, the City receives numerous complaints regarding both divisions of the 
program—delinquent tax and overdue parking fine collection.
204
 According to Mr. Zack, the Tax 
Office receives about 3-4 complaints a day, accounting for 60-70% of the complaints concerning 
the entire program.
205
 As of now though, the City treats them in an ad hoc way.
206
 Typically, the 
relevant officials will speak on the phone or meet with the complainant to describe what recourse 
may be available.
207
 The City, however, should create a formal system for logging complaints by 
various categories—nature of the incident, amount of the delinquency, Crown and City personnel 
involved—so that it has more information for improving the system in the future. Hopefully, 
such data collection would lead to insights about ways the City could create additional measures 
to hold Crown accountable. 
Second, the City should regularize communication with other Connecticut municipalities 
who are conducting similar tax-and-tow programs. As an innovator in this area,
208
 the City did 
not have the benefit of looking to past programs’ experience in designing its own. Now, 
however, numerous other Connecticut municipalities have followed New Haven’s lead and 
administer their own versions of the program.
209
 Most notably, Bridgeport runs a program of 
similar scope but still uses multiple towing companies.
210
 By regularly communicating with the 
relevant city officials in these other municipalities, the City could learn from their experiences 
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and even anticipate problems that the New Haven program might encounter in the future. 
Moreover, some of these municipalities may have more robust provider markets, such that New 
Haven could learn what types of accountability mechanisms competition has created elsewhere 
and then try to implement those mechanisms here.  
Thus, with both of these measures, the City could learn how to administer the program in 
a way that holds Crown and its employees more accountable.  
 
C. The RFQ: A Strategy for Implementation 
However, it will of course be difficult, given Crown’s strong bargaining position, to 
implement any accountability measures that would be costly or even merely inconvenient to the 
company.
211
 Thus, to maximize the chance that Crown adopts city-developed accountability 
mechanisms, the City must be strategic in future rounds of bargaining. Namely, the City should 
use Requests for Qualifications instead of Requests for Proposals. While Requests for Proposals 
would allow the City to hear open-ended plans for providing the tax-and-tow service, they are 
unlikely, in this market, to be particularly useful for the City, as Crown remains the only realistic 
provider. Requests for Qualifications, on the other hand, allow the City to set more specific 
requirements; bidders merely describe what resources make them eligible to complete the tasks 
carefully-described in the request.
212
  
Thus, to increase the chance of Crown accepting accountability measures, the City should 
insert into the next RFQ the accountability measures that it has developed in-house—described 
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in as detailed a fashion as possible.
213
 That way, Crown must either submit that it will follow 
those measures, or not bid, risking loss of the contract in hopes of calling the City’s bluff that it 
could operate the program successfully with another provider. While Crown may indeed have 
sufficient bargaining power to call this bluff and not bid, the City can always choose to announce 
a new, modified RFQ and hope for Crown’s acquiescence at that next round.
214
 The use of the 
RFQ process, in lieu of the RFP process, can thus improve the City’s bargaining position, even 
in the absence of meaningful market competition. 
 
V. Conclusion: The Possibility of In-Sourcing? 
If the City is able to expend the necessary resources, it should be able to hold Crown 
accountable to the purposes of the program—not only to recoup lost City revenue but to provide 
a convenient and fair service to all New Haven residents. However, the City may find either that 
does not have or is not willing to spend the resources necessary to effectively administer the 
contract. In that scenario, the City might find, with Crown’s performance deteriorating, that it is 
more cost-effective and consistent with the program goals to provide at least part of the 
program—namely, providing 24/7 bill collection and vehicle retrieval in-house.
215
  
Although this possibility of in-sourcing may seem far-fetched, given city officials’ almost 
uniform praise of the program,
216
 it would not be inconsistent with the experience of local 
governments in recent years. Indeed, researchers have found an increasing tendency to in-source 
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previously out-sourced services, including both towing and delinquent bill collection.
217
 In-
sourcing, however, may not be an ideal solution, as the City would have to incur substantial costs 
to provide 24/7 vehicle retrieval.  
If, then, the City would like to avoid this fate, it would be wise to adopt the measures 
outlined above. Specifically, the City should re-focus its administrative resources away from the 
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Interview with Michael V. Fumiatti, City Purchasing Agent - April 8, 2013 
General Questions 
1) How does your office develop the evaluative criteria for the RFP? Does that come from 
another part of the City government or is it developed in-house? Is that revised during the 
negotiation process?  
- Develop criteria in conjunction with Department requesting the contract  
- Find a proposal that was done before, not “reinvent the wheel” 
- Either from another municipality  
- Or similar from past services 
2) How does the city typically advertise/publicize RFP? I understand it is sometimes sent out to 
prospective parties – how does the city select these parties? Does the City have any 
obligation to contact some number/type of parties? How do long do vendors have to 
respond?   
- Advertisement in the N.H. Register – (this is where the Office’s legal obligation stops) 
- But also post solicitation on website and, for every RFP notice, e-mail out to those that 
have registered as providers for those types of services; also reach out to anyone with 
past experience  
- In their interest to get more than 1 proposal, but sometimes people just don’t respond 
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- Post advertisement on a Sunday; bid minimum is 10 days; 2-3 weeks typically – can 
always change date if receiving questions (flexibility) but Fumiatti thinks this is usually a 
good amount of time 
- Bid is due at a specific date and time, but with RFP the City doesn’t know exactly what it 
wants so may involve more back-and-forth 
3) Is the city under an obligation to negotiate with multiple parties simultaneously? Is that a 
practice? If negotiating one-one-one, does the city have to or does it typically tell other 
interested parties how the contract is taking shape? 
- Under no obligation to tell other bidders/proposers what’s going on 
- Because negotiation, don’t want to “tip our hand”  
- Not trying to play parties against each other – i.e. use that kind of leverage  
- Once RFP is on the street, vendor communication is shut down. All is done in writing – 
i.e. formal questions. Also Purchasing Department lets the other bureaus know the same. 
That way, they have to go through the appropriate channels for questions/clarification.  
- Since RFPs are more complicated, businesses may return with questions  
- RFPs are more complicated because the City doesn’t know exactly what it wants. Need to 
have more engagement – so vendors submit questions/clarifications which the Purchasing 
Agent sends to the relevant Department. 
- Then the review happens between the Department and the Purchasing Bureau.  
- Vendors may come in for interview/presentation  




- No actual internal rule or procedure, but Mr. Fumiatti abides by and tells his colleagues 
not to vote on contract if on committee but did not attend all presentations. But again no 
actual policy on this. This is Mr. Fumiatti’s policy. 
- The value of the presentation is largely explanatory. Sometimes proposals don’t show 
how good they are on paper. 
4) Is the city under an obligation or does it have a right to give preference to locally-based 
companies?  
- Local Preference Ordinance: 10% local preference. So if an outside vendor comes in with 
a contract for $100, and then a local vendor says I can do it for 109. New Haven business 
gets the contract if they’re willing to do it for $100.  
- Different in regard to RFPs because no price involved: “All else being equal.”  
- Mr. Fumiatti points out that this largely isn’t a problem in towing because the tow storage 
needs to be in the city anyway, far for them to travel – i.e. the business isn’t lucrative if 
you’re coming from far away. So he says this concern is not as important as it might 
otherwise be. 
- But says generally very difficult to quantify “all else being equal” 
- Would be very easy if it was 4 tow trucks vs. 6 
5) Once the contract is awarded, does administration pass to the City Controller, Michael 
O’Neill, or Chief Administrative Officer, Rob Smuts, or another official? If it’s in-house, 
how does that communication look?  
- Yes, passes on to the Department who developed criteria in the first place. Here, it’s quite 
a complicated contract. Internal Audit, Tax Office – Ed Zack 
- Transportation & Parking 
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6) Does renewal require a new RFP? If so, is that process similar/different to the original RFP 
process? 
- 1 year at a time – city budget reasons 
- So because of that, contract with options to renew 
- If no ability to renew, hardship to city because contracts wouldn’t be desirable – i.e. need 
to make capital  commitment for vendor affordable (Fumiatti says here there’s not that 
big of a capital investment so that may be less of a concern) 
- City can decide not to renew – does this 1-2 times/year (so not common); tends to happen 
when vendors think it’ll be easy working for the city, but then find out the city actually 
monitors its contracts 
- Do not need a new RFP for renewing, but do need one when run out of options to renew 
7) Generally, what does the Purchasing office see as its main tools to ensure quality in service 
provision – length of contract (renewal process), relationships with businesses, 
specifications? Does the city often reserve the right to revoke a contract? Does the Bureau of 
Purchases make that decision? 
- Fumiatti emphasized getting the specifications right before it goes out – so that price is 
really the determining factor; still important in these RFP cases as well 
- Let’s say you have 2-3 shortlisted contractors; the Purchasing Bureau will then ask for 
the best and final proposal  
- Now in the case of towing, the pricing is set by statute; but in others, try to keep with 
“current market value,” which could mean someone’s been doing a good job at 50/hr. 
Comes back and says we can continue doing that and the same price, and the City is 
likely going to accept that contract.  
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- True negotiation happens only with one vendor at a time. Don’t pit them against one 
another. Says government contracting is different than private enterprise contracting – 
here, you’re instead basing it on fairness. 
- Based on questions/clarifications, the vendors should know what is important 
- Government is different than private business – “open and transparent”  
- Do allow for “best & final proposal” – by that time, in an RFP, everyone should know 
what’s important 
Towing 
8) For what reasons did the City decide to go with Crown?  
- Got to be open 24/7  
- Credit card operations 
- Grab updated data 
- Also have to be able to adjust to legislation/regulation/policy changes  
9) I understand the City received two other responses – one from Columbus Auto and one from 
an out-of-state company. I was wondering if you knew why Crown’s proposal was found to 
be superior? Jessica Mayorga described the Columbus’s as incomplete – in what way was 
that true? How was the other proposal inadequate?  
- 2 responses (no mention of the third response.) 
- 1 response was non-responsive  
- Only really had Crown to work with 
- So Controller, Internal Audit, Tax, Traffic & Parking worked with department to 
develop/negotiate the contract 
- First time that they were doing something like that 
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- So now, for 2013, this experience has allowed them to make a really good RFQ 
- 2013 has been awarded to Crown  
- Other respondent was Tony’s Long Wharf 
- Mr. Fumiatti was on the Committee 
- Mr. Fumiatti wasn’t at presentation, so recused himself from voting  
- Awarded to Crown, “based on overall responsiveness”  
- Reason they had new RFQ (note, not RFP) was that there were no more options to renew. 
Once options are exhausted, can’t renew. 
- 2008: Columbus Auto had basically just filed in the proposal form but didn’t actually 
draft a proposal of what they’d be doing. So there was no substance to evaluate them on. 
- And Columbus didn’t inquire. Mr. Fumiatti says they can’t do RFP for them but they’re 
happy to explain generally what needs to be done if asked – they make themselves 
available for this. 
10) Relatedly, was the city under any obligation to contact any particular towing companies 
about the RFP process?  
- Notified the towing companies via e-mail 
- Via system that’s been up and running for 5 years 
- Login does expire annually or bi-annually 
- Vendors have to login to renew. Don’t do so, however, then left off the lists 
- Do the renewal thing so they’re not sending out constantly bouncing back proposal 
requests 
- Mr. Fumiatti sees this as a very small burden to put on potential contractors 
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11) What’s the time-frame for renewal on Crown Towing’s contract? Does renewal require a 
new RFP? If so, is that process similar/different to the original RFP process?  
- Think there were 4 options. 
12) What does the City – and particularly, the Purchasing Bureau – see as its main contracting 
tools in making sure Crown, or any other towing service provider for that matter, provides 
its service in a high quality way?  
- Didn’t do a lot of negotiating (sounds like 2013) – proposal was very well written in 
terms of what was being done. That’s really the key here: being able to ask for what you 
want and then getting the answer. 
- Had a really good agreement to work from 
- A lot of other variables not in play here – state prices 
- Confirmed it’s a RFQ 
Miscellaneous: 
Separate mechanism for Police Department towing – apply directly there to get on rotation. As 
long as in “good standing” with the City – no outstanding obligations. No contracts behind that, 




Interview with Officer Francis Lombardi, Chief of the Police Department’s Municipal 
Towing Unit – April 10, 2013 
1) Walk me through a tow. What types of enforcement discretion decisions are made? Is this 
process formalized in a written way? 
- Up to 10 towers  
- Submit applications, renewal period is April 1-March 31 (my note: starts with street 
sweeping) then there is a written contract, saying they’ll follow the policy.  
- 2 were suspended within the last few months (thinks January) – for criminal concerning a 
state warrant  father and son towing companies  
- 9 towing companies right now (8?)  father and son, no preclusion in ordinance that 
stops family members. Lombardi thinks the policy should be changed in the ordinance – 
family members can’t, and define family members – not second cousin once-removed, 
but father & son, brothers, etc. 
- 8 or 9? One was nollied, so that might be the reason my notes are confusing on this.  
- If they get denied, there’s an appeals process to the Board of Police Commissioners – and 
if not satisfied with that, can use the court system 
- But actual process: officers in field call communication point – PSAP (public safety 
answering point)  upstairs office, then call tow rotation, since tows have different 
values to the companies, keep different tow lists – accidents, recoveries, abandoned –
Officer Lombardi says this goes on upstairs and they’re more familiar with it. – Keep a 
record of who towed what; towing company (police)? Fills out H1-14; within 48 hours 
have to send a certified letter to the registered owner of the vehicle so they don’t keep 
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incurring charges; vehicle owners call PSAP, who then punch plate into the database to 
see which company car was towed  
- Categories: stolen & recoveries, accidents, police tow, tickets (which can be included 
under police tow, if police officer designates ticket) – this is not super clear, see above.  
- (Abandoneds are obviously least desirable cause no one ever pays them)  
- Tows have to go through garage – that’s where pick-up happens 
- Zoning issues: go through Zoning for lot spaces – need 100 spaces. Can rent 
space in New Haven – but vehicles have to come through garage 
- Zoning does its own CI  
- Zoning not approving more tow lots; want desirable business 
- Garages have to be open 24/7  
- Officer Lombardi would like to see update – ordinance says have to keep 2-way radios. 
Who uses 2-way radios anymore? Cell phones should be fine. Smart phone etc.  
- Updates have to happen through Rob Smuts, Chief Administrative Officer – Officer 
Lombardi can’t implement them on his own. Obviously, Smuts is a busy guy.  
2) City of New Haven Municipal Towing Policy. Any way to get the document? 
- Gave it to me. Authored by City – Corporation Counsel – police, collaborative effort.  
3) Is you department involved at all with the tax-and-tow system? 
- Not at all. 
4) How are the towers on the rotation list selected? What qualifications do they have to have? 
What type of verbal/written communication do they have with the Department and is that 
available to public? 
- Application puts in request with police  
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- Go through Zoning for lot spaces – need 100 spaces. Can rent space in New Haven – but 
vehicles have to come through garage  
- Zoning does its own CI  
- Zoning not approving more tow lots; want desirable business 
- In application, have to show insurance per ordinance to the police 
- Also have to be a licensed wrecker  which is a State application  have to have 
Service bay. Example, company in Hamden wanted to register its vehicles in New Haven 
and then tow to lot with rental spots. Couldn’t though because it didn’t have a service bay 
(other tow companies actually made Officer Lombardi aware of this) – didn’t want to pay 
for the service bay so ended up not doing it.  
- When State gives the OK – that involves lights, letter, phone numbers, fire extinguisher, 
broom, shovel, etc. – generally means OK to tow 
5) How do towing companies affirmatively demonstrate compliance? Are there any contracts 
involved? 
- Annual licensing process (Officer Lombardi seemed to emphasize annual part)  
- Problem: licensing period doesn’t run concurrent with tax period  
- I.e. next March, won’t find out until then? 
- Officer Lombardi suggests this be changed legislatively – make it concurrent. There was 
talk of having a July check-up with the Tax Collector, but those “fell by the wayside.”  
- Towing companies under no duty to tell they’re delinquent. No duty to inform 
6) How often are there incidents with non-compliance? Is there a back-up queue of towers? 
- Gotten pretty good – rarely hear complaints (couldn’t put a number on it though…) 
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- Officer Lombardi would like a policy – ordinance? – that tow trucks have to have GPS. 
Apparently, a lot of the private towers want this on their own vehicles too. Earlier had 
gotten complaints about speeding. The speed limit for towing is 40mph. Apparently, 
there’s technology that would ring the owner’s cell-phone anytime a tower was speeding 
(vis-a-vis GPS).  
- CT State police have policy that they ask to see towers’ driver license when doing a tow. 
New Haven doesn’t have this policy (while the police maintain the right to) – maybe 
should adopt one 
- Towing owners like above because it helps lower their insurance rate? 
- GPS apparently can also let you know a vehicle has been lifted – which is key, because 
an officer at scene in his discretion can make decision to have vehicle dropped – and then 
would know where owner could pick it up 
- GPS not that expensive 
- Also privately, video surveillance of lots for break-ins etc. – not in the best areas. 
Employee problems too. 
- There are a few other companies that want to get on the list. But tough to open a lot  
zoning for parking.  
7) What types of incidents are there (both related to compliance and not really to compliance – 
e.g. vehicle damage)? How often do they occur? Do you keep any data on this? If so, can I 
have it? 




- People sometimes complain about tow companies going the wrong way – they’re not 
authorized to do so, there’s even limitations on police going the wrong way. That’s 
messed up.  
- But towing companies say it’s easier to pick up FWD from the front. So want to be able 
to go wrong way 
- Also more AWAD 
- Officer Lombardi talked about a new device that’s very expensive – from the side, do 
everything from the inside (like a forklift)  
- Aside: private companies – police haven’t had a problem with liability – i.e. being 
blamed etc. for towing company mishap/damage 
- Licensing – technicians – special license for towers. Not a city or state ordinance, but 
Officer Lombardi thinks this would be a good thing to add to the ordinance to make sure 
towers have a certain level of training. There’s a whole Tower’s Association.  
8) Any changes in time over how towers are selected? Either in mechanism or criteria?  
- No. 
9) Private property tows? 
- People come out – with street sweeping, for instance, you have to drop it when people 
come out 
- But on private property, people have to come out and have keys 
- There’s also the Go-Jack, which they’re not supposed to charge. Conn. DMV says there’s 
not supposed to – it helps them get into tight spots so don’t have to have a second person. 




- Officer Lombardi thinks you should have to operate under the same rules on private as 
public property – towing companies object. His answer: If you’re on our list, should have 
to follow for all tows on City, and you have to be on list. 
- Another private property tow issue – some will tax cash only on these tows.  
- Updates to these policies – and this issue have to be done with Rob Smuts, Chief 
Administrative Officer – sit down and meet to discuss tow policy. Frank says he’s 
prepared materials for these meetings but haven’t happened.  
Miscellaneous:  
- Update to include Amex. Think should be changed in ordinance.  
- Tow Review has to be done by an outside department – so at 200 Orange. Officer 
Lombardi says they don’t hear anything at 200 orange so either no issues or issues are 
being filtered and addressed there. Start to hear complaints at street sweeping times. 
- -Snow issues:  
- Pre-tow, have to shovel vehicle out. They would start shoveling and then people 
would come out and say, “I’m ready to go,” and per policy couldn’t tow them. 
Frank told them to charge the $88. 
- Also, charge sales tax now, and $4 fuel charge as long as diesel is more than $3.50/gal. 
- Not allowed to charge for mileage in the city – another question of if they’re doing that 






Interview with Michael O’Neil, City Controller & Ed Zack, Chief Internal Auditor –  
April 10, 2013 
1) It’s my understanding that your office developed the criteria for the 2008 contract. How did 
you go about doing so? Was the idea of a sole provider in mind from the beginning? I know 
Columbus had related to the media that they would have kept the rotation for these services.  
- Prior to VioAlert, State Marshals 
- Prior to 2008, 1-year of VioAlert, who did booting and then contracted out for towing 
services themselves (VioAlert administered the separate contracts)  
- Problems with billings, too high an error rate  dealing with multiple towing 
companies 
- Mr. Zack: part of the RFP was to centralize 
- Mr. O’Neil: idea around town that other companies decided not to bid, so as to keep 
rotation system 
- Other criteria: 
- Ability to accept payments 
- 24/7 service 
- Ability to purchase boots 
- Situations where people would rather abandon cars, so need a vendor that can 
actually auction (responsibly) 
2) Mr. Fumiatti mentioned using other model contracts or past experience? Was that the case 
here?  Familiar with other municipalities that do something similar? 
- No previous models for this type of contract 
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- First one to start this kind of program in CT 
- Mark Pietrosimone deserves credit for coming up with it 
- Other cities have started too – Bridgeport does, thinks Hartford, some of the other smaller 
towns 
3) How was the towing of tax-delinquent vehicles done previously? Were there any contracts?  
- Prior to VioAlert, State Marshals 
- Prior to 2008, 1-year of VioAlert, who did booting and then contracted out for towing 
services themselves (VioAlert administered the separate contracts)  
- The program does not adequately safeguard against (1) Crown’s employees’ stealing 
funds from bill-payers; or (2) Crown’s potential to improperly use discretion in 
determining which vehicles are actually booted or towed.  
4) Walk me through a tax-and-tow today. The data pull, etc.  
- Someone owes taxes  
- First send demand 
- Then issue warrant  
- For example, January taxes, due Feb 1, send demand in February, start towing March 1 
- Provide data file to Crown – via private operator LSAG 
5) What happened with using Marshals? Does someone have to sign off each time now? 
- Used Marshals with VioAlert 
- State Banking Commission letter – technically a warrant but not a physical letter (boot or 
tow) 
- For taxes, you get towed; for tickets, it’s boot or tow – for example, SUVs though, might 
need to get different hauler 
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- For handicap, always get towed – that’s Traffic and Parking 
- For $200 or greater, boot 
- For $400 or greater, tow  
- Crown has 2 trucks on at all times, and 1 additional car equipped with a plate reader (tow 
trucks also, I think) 
6) 2013 RFQ – How were those criteria developed? What was the time-frame here for proposals 
(may need to ask Mr. Fumiatti)?  
- O’Neil: in process, haven’t negotiated with them (Crown) yet. 
- New criteria though – reliability of drivers – how long have they been employed? 
Background checks? Ongoing procedures  
- Mr. Zack: believes City has a lot of negotiating power. If you want to do business with 
us, you kinda have to listen to us. O’Neil + Corporate Counsel + Senior Management to 
make negotiation. 
- O’Neil: Of course, though, you weigh any concerns about specific evaluative criteria vs. 
a desire to have a reliable vendor. I.e., Crown is reliable and thus has some negotiating 
leverage. 
- O’Neil discussed a proposal – not agreed to by Crown yet – that there’d be a notification 
on the truck to not give payments to drivers. But Crown’s objecting because their drivers 
do accept payments for private tows. So couldn’t be permanently affixed? 
7) What types of monitoring does your department do? Other departments? Has this been 
different in 2008 vs. 2013? What difficulties does the Department see in monitoring? What’s 
the system for inter-Departmental communication? Any issues with that?  
- Compliance: radio-in contact, to Collections for tickets, and to Tax for taxes  
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- Mr. Zack: during work hours, taxpayers have to come to here, 200 Orange to pay 
- During off-hours, weekends, go to Crown 
- Mr. O’Neil – verification issue if someone has paid between data pull in the morning – 
the radio process tries to prevent that (i.e. making sure it hasn’t been paid between data 
upload). 
- Also, there are the red stickers on the windshield – proposal to try to add info to that to 
make it really clear – but the idea is to make sure the taxpayer is as informed as possible 
about their means of recourse etc. 
10) What is the complaint system? Is it different if there’s a problem with the tow vs. with the 
tax? Differences with new contract? 
- O’Neil: working on making improvements (more a desire?) to the complaint process. I.e. 
the sticker. 
- Mr. Zack: to avoid “status quo,” make improvements in system. Internal Audit is contact 
for tax-related complaints. Corporate Counsel, Investigative Services handles, well, 
investigations. 
- Make sure the red sticker is very clear – discussing this on upcoming Tuesday meeting 
- Add language to sticker, but Crown doesn’t want this (Mr. O’neil says); where payment 
should be made, how it can be made.  
11) There seems to be an inherent difficulty with complaints – many are going to be frivolous. 
How does the Department try to weed out the ones that require response & action? 
- Mr. O’Neil sees this as a problem, even internally.  
- Tax and Collections deal with everyday complaints 
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- Different complaints go to Mayor’s Office – Mr. O’Neil: with “good set of 
circumstances.”  
- Different problem:   
- Not dealing with abuse in Tax Office? 
- Keeping collection rate at 98% 
- O’Neil: When told stories, etc. – different people, come from Mayor’s office, says prone 
to be sympathetic 
- Mr. Zack: Mike and Mark treat fairly every one and do an impressive job of doing so. 
- O’Neil: problem – currently being discussed in 2013 contract. What do you with property 
in the vehicle?  
- Do you let people get it? Under what circumstances? What types of property? A 
cell phone might be more clear cut, but a car radio? 
- Also, employees, what do you do about them? Trying to clarify this with the new contract 
12) How did the Department try to incorporate these complaints, if any, into the new contract? 
I’m thinking especially of the issue re: employees taking cash for tax payments. 
- Proposal to try to add info to red windshield sticker– idea is to make sure the taxpayer is 
as informed as possible about their means of recourse. Make sure the red sticker is very 
clear – discussing this on upcoming Tuesday meeting 
- Crown doesn’t want to add info to sticker; where payment should be made, how it can be 
made.  
13) Difference between 2008 and 2013: 
- O’Neil: virtually the whole program has been refined in the last 5 years  
- Incremental, responsive to problems 
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- Most important details: 
- Employees 
- Recovering property in vehicles 
- Improving oversight and communications (structure) 
- Crown now accepts credit cards for tax payments, but only from registered 
owner 
Miscellaneous: 
- Mr. Zack: previously no enforcement of vehicle taxes.  
- Pursue delinquent vehicles 
- Compuplus – parking ticket vendor (guessing they would have noticed when back 
tax rolls?) 
- Send out notices $200 or greater – and then tax warrant 
- Collection rate is now 98% 
- MTS – discovery service, discovery of property  
- MTS uses plate readers – ability to recognize plate – continue to troll, establish residency 
- Choosing Crown over Tony’s in 2013 – convenience for property owner – better location 
 factor was not determinative, however  
- Committee with Traffic & Parking, Tax, and Collections.  
- Mr. O’Neil: all towing companies are known quantities because administration of 
municipal towing services  
- So there’s known reputation of vendor, and that obviously plays into the contract. 




Interview with Ed Zack, Chief Internal Auditor – April 12, 2013 
1) In designing the 2013 RFQ and in current negotiations with Crown, have there been any 
discussions regarding where to locate liability for improper tows? For example, if the 
City’s record wasn’t up to date regarding a particular taxpayer and that taxpayer was 
subsequently towed, would the City automatically pay the towing bill to Crown? 
Conversely, if Crown made a mistake, are they expected to waive charges for the tow? 
Has there been any discussion of the City or Crown (whoever was liable) also having to 
compensate the taxpayer for inconvenience? Was this a feature discussed in the 2008 
contract? Was this part of the discussion in 2008? 
- Car damage, Crown’s liability 
- Error in tow – with data – City pays amount of tow to customer (reimbursement) 
- Same as 2008 
2) Is there any formalized appeals process for tax-related tows outside of the court system?  
- Yes, there’s the Board of Alderman, Tax Appeals Commission  
3) I understand the 2008 contract had three options to renew. How many options to renew is 
the 2013 contract expected to have? Has this been a point of internal discussion and/or 
negotiation with Crown? 
- Haven’t started yet 
- Yearly renew, gives the City greater flexibility 
- Didn’t get a firm answer on renewal periods 
4) I imagine it’s possible that Crown could bring some discretion into enforcement by 
declining to tow a specific delinquent vehicle. Has there been any discussion of requiring 
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that all scanned plate data go back to the City and make towing required whenever 
there’s a match? If not, would your office be interested in such a policy? How do you 
think Crown would react?  
- Every day at 5 o’clock – thumbnails, data is loaded into Crown’s system 
- Assume they’re towing everyone 
- Mr. Zack seems to think it should be mandatory, doesn’t think Crown should have 
any discretion – City should (Mr. Zack seemed receptive to the idea of making it 
mandatory) 
5) What are the rules if someone comes out while the car is actually being towed for back 
taxes and wants to pay (both for when your office is open and after hours)? Would it be 
possible to allow these payments (and thus stop the towing and further incurred charges) 
and have a notification affixed to the vehicle that says drivers must provide receipts? 
- Tax program just goes in streets – and New Haven Parking Authority lots (based on 
separate permission; where they just boot, not tow); no driveways 
- No way to stop tax payment at-side; idea is that boot is the time to pay. 
6) I understand Crown might not want to add more information to the red notification 
sticker that they affix during booting. Does your office have an explanation for why they 
might not want to do so? Do you think this would reduce the overall number of tows? 
- Issue with size of the sticker. They’re the City’s forms – the City buys and supplies 
them to Crown 
- Issue over how big the sticker is going to be (City wants it bigger) 
- Based on experience in the field, Crown thinks language is too restrictive  being 
discussed now with Corporation Counsel 
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7) My understanding is that Tax and Collection deal with the majority of “every day” 
complaints. What’s the volume of those complaints and the breakdown between the two 
offices? 
- Tax is getting 3-4 complaints a day. 
- And between Tax and Collections, Tax is about 60-70% of complaints related to 
towing (the majority) 
8) Officer Lombardi talked about using technicians – requiring extra licensing for Crown. 
Would that be viable? 
- Hasn’t been discussed – separate towing policies, but Mr. Zack thinks they should 
still be uniform, i.e. comply with Police Board 
- Says the technicians might be a good point  Mr. Zack said he would discuss the 
feasibility with Corporation Counsel 
  
 
